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A SONG OF ICE AND FIRE: OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATES AND
THE REGULATORY LAWS THAT GOVERN THE ‘METHANE DRAGON’
John Thomas†
Abstract
Offshore methane hydrates have recently made headlines as various
countries began experimenting with methods of exploration and
extraction of the resource. The value and abundance of this resource
presents many exciting opportunities as researchers and developers
begin to contemplate the possibility of commercial development of
methane hydrate reserves. This Comment seeks to explore the legal
regulations in place and assess whether the current legal regime, both
in the United States and internationally, would be able to efficiently
regulate methane hydrates and their unique composition due to
difficulties stemming from exploration and extraction. In particular,
this Comment will look at how to impose liability after an accident
resulting from exploration and extraction of offshore methane
hydrates. Ultimately, because of their unique nature and the narrow
focus of current legal institutions that govern liability of off drilling
accidents, this Comment recommends the institution of different
liability standards to successfully cover the unique problems inherent
with Offshore methane hydrates.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Take a chunk of this stuff up to the surface[,] and it looks and
feels much like ice, except for a give-away fizzing sensation in the
palm of your hand, but put a match to it and it doesn’t just melt, it
ignites.”1 This statement is referring to a chemical known as a methane
hydrate, more colloquially known as “fiery ice.”2 The substance, most
commonly found in the ocean, has been of interest to many in the
energy world because of its potential to alleviate the tensions caused
by the depleting reserve of fossil fuels and potable water.3 Scientists
speculate that methane hydrates may be able to produce more energy
than the current estimation of reserves of fossil fuels with one-third of
the carbon footprint.4 In 2013, Japan made a large stride in developing
1. Martha Henriques, Why ‘Flammable Ice’ Could be the Future of Energy,
BBC (Nov. 22, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20181119-why-flammableice-could-be-the-future-of-energy [https://perma.cc/6SFU-V6UG].
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. Hiroko Tabuchi, An Energy Coup for Japan: ‘Flammable Ice’, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/business/global/japan-saysit-is-first-to-tap-methane-hydrate-deposit.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1
[https://perma.cc/RG39-P9VB]; Martha Henriques, Why ‘Flammable Ice’ Could be
the
Future
of
Energy,
BBC
(Nov.
22,
2018),
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20181119-why-flammable-ice-could-be-thefuture-of-energy [https://perma.cc/6SFU-V6UG].
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strategies for efficient and safe extraction and exploration of methane
hydrates.5 This experimental expedition gave Japan and other
countries hope that this resource may become a commercially viable
alternative to coal and natural gas as a world leader in energy.6 Upon
the conclusion of the maiden voyage of Japan’s extraction of methane
hydrates, a senior researcher remarked, “[n]ow we know that
extraction is possible.”7 Japan also conducted a second test in 2017
and was able to successfully run the well for 24 hours without
incident.8 While many applaud the innovative developments that are
beginning to pave the way for offshore methane hydrates to become a
sustainable source of energy, others believe methane hydrates are
more detrimental than they are beneficial. “We are waking up the
methane dragon. And that’s a dragon we really want to keep in the
box.”9 Those who ascribe to Samantha Joye’s apocalyptic notions
regarding methane hydrates and their commercial development posit
that the extraction of the resource will emit greenhouse gases into the
atmosphere, and as a general matter, that extraction has the capacity
to produce catastrophic results.10 Some critics even believe an
innocuous misstep in exploration or extraction could lead to a
tsunami.11
Perhaps more concerning is the lack of legal framework in
place for these future events. The commercial development for
exploration and extraction of offshore methane hydrates is becoming
an inevitable certitude. As countries and private companies alike begin
to put structures in place for economic development purposes, a legal
5. See Hiroko Tabuchi, An Energy Coup for Japan: ‘Flammable Ice’, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/business/global/japa
n-says-it-is-first-to-tap-methane-hydrate-deposit.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1
[https://perma.cc/RG39-P9VB].
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. Martha Henriques, Why ‘Flammable Ice’ Could be the Future of Energy,
BBC (Nov. 22, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20181119-why-flammableice-could-be-the-future-of-energy [https://perma.cc/6SFU-V6UG].
9. Chris D’Angelo, Chasing the Methane Dragon That Lurks in The Deep Sea,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Sep.
2,
2019,
7:53
AM
ET),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/methane-hydrate-atlantic-samanthajoye_n_5d681737e4b0488c0d117841?guccounter=1
[https://perma.cc/F7D92YXL].
10. See id.
11. Martha Henriques, Why ‘Flammable Ice’ Could be the Future of Energy,
BBC (Nov. 22, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20181119-why-flammableice-could-be-the-future-of-energy [https://perma.cc/6SFU-V6UG].
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framework is essential to guide and regulate the exploration and
extraction of offshore methane hydrates. With this framework, it is
imperative to recognize international laws that establish a legal
governance in a global context. This Comment will examine domestic
and international laws that would govern the extraction and
exploration of offshore methane hydrates in the United States, with a
particular lens on how liability is assessed in the wake of an offshore
accident. Specifically, this Comment will highlight the particular
problem of what type of liability standard is best suited to handle the
dangerous nature inherent in offshore methane hydrate exploration
and extraction. Finally, this Comment will look at the current legal
framework and determine whether a new framework would provide a
better structure for efficient, safe, and environmentally sound
exploration and extraction of offshore methane hydrates. Part II of this
Comment will expand upon intricacies of the resource itself, outlining
the chemical components and putative role it can play in solving
problems such as the lack of energy and water. Additionally, Part II
will enumerate the hazards connected to the extraction of methane
hydrates in the ocean that create obstacles for future economic
viability. Part III will survey the domestic laws that impose obligations
for offshore spills and accidents. Part IV will look at the international
obligations currently in place and their specific relation to the United
States, with a particular focus on the United Nations Convention for
the Law of the Sea. Part IV will provide an analysis of the current
landscape and pose that robust additions be made to the United
Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea and the International
Seabed Authority’s Mining Code to ensure that liability can be
assessed internationally. Part V will provide a way forward, giving
thoughts on a normative regime that could govern offshore methane
hydrates in a way that allows companies to enter the market and ensure
a forum to compensate victims. Finally, Part VI will provide a
summation of the main points of the Comment and concludes.
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II. WHAT IS A METHANE HYDRATE?
A. Allow Me to Introduce My Friend, Methane Hydrates
Methane hydrates have many denominations. They have been
referred to as natural gas hydrates, gas clathrates, or clathrates.12
Methane hydrates are composed of two ingredients: fresh water and
pure natural gas.13 Under the right circumstances, the water forms
“tiny ice cages” around the individual methane molecules, while
simultaneously forcing out any other salt or acid molecules.14 Because
excess materials are forced out of the compound molecule, the end
result is a methane hydrate with the ability to produce both fresh water
and natural gas.15 Methane hydrates are predominantly made of water,
consisting of roughly 85% water and 15% methane gas.16 Methane
hydrates are created and best thrive in low temperatures.17
Furthermore, they are best formed under high pressures and also
require high pressurization to remain stable.18 Despite their icy or
slushy appearance, methane hydrates are stable in temperatures
ranging from negative five degrees Celsius to positive thirty-four
degrees Celsius, or from twenty-three degrees Fahrenheit to ninetythree degrees Fahrenheit.19 Both biological and non-biological
processes can create methane hydrates.20 Methane is usually produced
biologically as a product of waste from microorganisms as they
consume biological material.21 Methane can also be produced nonbiologically through spontaneous decomposition of organism matter,
which tends to occur only when the temperature of the organic
material exceeds 100 degrees Celsius; however, this process is
12. Roy Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus: Planning Ahead for the Commercial
Development of Offshore Methane Hydrates, 15 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 16,
17 (2015) [hereinafter Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus].
13. ROY ANDREW PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE
METHANE HYDRATE OPERATIONS: CIVIL LIABILITY AND REGULATIONS FOR
EFFICIENT GOVERNANCE 13 (Kurt Deketelaere ed., 2017) [hereinafter PARTAIN,
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE OPERATIONS].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 16.
17. Id. at 18.
18. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 17.
19. Id.
20. Erin Jackson, Fire and Ice: Regulating Methane Hydrate as a New Potential
Energy Source, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 611, 613 (2014).
21. Id.
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relatively uncommon.22 Methane hydrates are typically found in two
distinct locations. The first is permafrost regions, and the second is
below the sea floor.23 When methane hydrates exist offshore, they
usually form and are found within the first 200 kilometers of the
shoreline.24 Offshore methane hydrates can sometimes be found as
shallow as 150 meters; however, the natural resource is most
commonly found more than 500 meters below the sea floor.25
B. A People’s History of Offshore Methane Hydrates
Scientists have known about methane hydrates for over two
centuries; however, the substance known to them at the time was one
created in a laboratory and not one found in nature.26 The biological
methane hydrates found below the sea floor have remained a largely
unknown resource until recently.27 The first methane hydrate gas field
was discovered in 1964 in Siberia.28 The first survey was taken in
1970, and eleven years later, the first attempt to recover the resource
was made.29 It was not until the 1990s, however, that methane hydrates
finally became recognized as an energy resource that could potentially
and feasibly be commercially developed.30 The first offshore methane
hydrate well was drilled in 1999.31 It was only six years ago when
Japan produced a methane hydrate well that could flow continuously,
and it was only two years ago when they produced a well that could
continuously flow for more than twenty-four hours.32 Because
methane hydrates are relatively new and unproven, there is uncertainty
regarding its economic viability in the future.33 The Japanese
government has speculated that commercial exploration of offshore
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 26.
25. Jackson, supra note 20, at 613.
26. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 13.
27. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 16.
28. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 14.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 16.
32. Tabuchi, supra note 4; Henriques, supra note 1.
33. Tabuchi, supra note 4.
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methane hydrates may occur as early as 2023.34 Others are less
optimistic about the proposed timeline and believe the ability to
develop the natural resource commercially will take much longer.35
Despite claims that the government’s estimations are overly
ambitious, Japan may have more of an impetus to create the
technology to commercially extract methane hydrates in an
economically viable manner.36 Countries like Japan and South Korea
lack other forms of natural gas and typically incur extra costs
connected with importing energy to their country; thus, these countries
may have more incentive to begin to produce methane hydrates
commercially.37 Despite the fact that the United States has the ability
to rely on other forms of energy, the excitement surrounding methane
hydrates has not diminished.38 The head of methane hydrate research
for the United States Department of Energy has stated that production
of methane from methane hydrates deposits has been feasible since
2005.39 Dr. Carolyn Ruppel, despite her preface that she does not carry
around a crystal ball, believes that a long-term extraction experiment,
lasting months to a full year, could occur by 2025.40 Many hope that
these statements, in conjunction with one another, show that
commercial feasibility is coming in the very near term.41
C. Future Potential Benefits of Offshore Methane Hydrate Extraction
1. Global Abundance of the Natural Resource
What makes methane hydrates so desirable as a putative
alternative to other fossil fuels is its sheer abundance in the global
context. Scientists originally speculated that the methane hydrate
reserves would only be double the size of other fossil fuel reserves;
however, others now have realized that this figure was a “very
conservative understatement.”42 The most recent estimates have
34. Henriques, supra note 1.
35. Id.
36. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 14.
37. Id.
38. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 16.
39. Id.
40. Henriques, supra note 1.
41. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 16.
42. Tabuchi, supra note 4; PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM
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varied considerably; however, one survey took a collection of the
varied estimates and found that most estimates are currently assuming
at least a hundred-fold, if not more, increase over conventional fossil
fuels.43 One survey speculated that there would be enough producible
methane hydrate reserves to provide the entire globe with sufficient
energy supplies for a millennium.44
Not only is there a large quantity of the resource where it
exists, but it also appears to exist across the globe. Estimates state that
there are currently seventy locations where methane hydrate reserves
have been identified.45 In essence, methane hydrate fields have been
found across almost every coastline.46 This should be juxtaposed with
current oil and gas fields, which are limited both in quantity and
location.47 Because of the seeming surplus of methane hydrates across
the globe, many countries will be able to become subsistence energy
producers, providing both revenue and affordable energy to their
economies.48 While not all countries would have access to methane
hydrates, the number of resource owners is drastically larger than
those who currently own traditional fossil fuels.49
A complicated issue, and one that is beyond the ultimate scope
of this Comment, is that the commercial development of offshore
methane hydrates could create a further disparity of wealth between
coastal states and those that are landlocked.50 Countries with access to
methane hydrate deposits will benefit from the profits, unlike those
countries that do not have access to it.51 Furthermore, impoverished
countries that do have access to offshore methane hydrates; may be
more willing to let private companies exploit the resource with limited
legal restrictions in place.52 The lack of legal restrictions would attract
companies that are seeking to limit their liability, especially
OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 19.
43. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 19.
44. Id. at 21.
45. Jackson, supra note 20, at 614.
46. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 26.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 28.
49. Id. at 29.
50. Id. at 28.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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considering the inherent dangers present with methane hydrate
exploration and extraction.53 The danger with this model is that it
could create a proverbial “race to the bottom” between nations whose
economies are in need of financial stability; therefore, companies
would extract the methane hydrate resource without any structure in
place to enforce liability.54 The lack of governance over the
exploration and extraction of methane hydrates could prove damaging
to the country’s marine life, and companies could avoid liability for
any catastrophic damage caused from potential methane leakage or
landslides.55
When discussing the putative economic benefits of offshore
methane hydrates, it is important to consider what is stopping private
companies from investing enough capital to ensure that commercial
development becomes a reality. Some have speculated that the
commercial development of methane hydrates would be a complete
“game changer” in global energy markets, providing substantial
benefits to national and global economies.56 Others are more
recalcitrant, believing that an incentive to develop technology to
commercially produce methane hydrates will not become prevalent as
long as shale gas continues to be a major player in the energy
industry.57 The main argument stemming from this line of thought is
that producing shale is currently less expensive than producing
methane from hydrates.58 The cost of producing shale has decreased
dramatically in recent years, and the possibility that the cost of
methane hydrates also decreases is equally as plausible.59 If that
reduction in costs occurs, a “tidal wave” of energy production could
flood the American markets, causing a shock in the markets larger than
the previous surprise caused by shale gas.60 Furthermore, while
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
See infra Part II.D.
Edward Dodge, Methane Hydrates are a Promising Energy Resource,
BREAKING ENERGY (Feb. 10, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://breakingenergy.com/2015/02
/10/methane-hydrates-are-a-promising-energy-resource/ [https://perma.cc/B7HH6F9P].
57. Clare Foran, Is Methane Hydrate the Energy Source of the Future?, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 24, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/12/is
-methane-hydrate-the-energy-source-of-the-future/444258/ [https://perma.cc/995ASZ5N].
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Foran, supra note 57; Dodge, supra note 56.
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America is “awash with natural gas,” other countries, like Japan, are
forced to import most of their natural gas, and production of hydrates
could contribute to the global economy from an import standpoint.61
Another benefit of the methane hydrate is the amount of water
that could be produced and utilized from the resource. As previously
stated, roughly 85% of a methane hydrate is water.62 The water
extracted from methane hydrates would be available for both
consumer and agricultural uses.63 The extracted water would take little
treatment, if any at all, to become potable.64 The potential for the water
of a methane hydrate to become potable water could go a long way in
alleviating the tension caused by the global drought and the
predictions of water scarcity in the next twenty years. Some have
treated the water portion of a methane hydrate as a disposal cost, or
something that inhibits the extraction of the methane gas.65 However,
given that global drought may currently constitute a “slow-moving
natural disaster,” the water retrieved from methane hydrates may assist
in a more immediate capacity, considering that there are current
reserves for traditional fossil fuels.66
2. Offshore Methane Hydrates: A Greener Future?
The next logical question, then, is so what? Are we merely
replacing the devil we know with the devil we do not? In the very least,
methane hydrates would alleviate the tension caused by depleting
conventional fossil fuels. At current levels of global consumption,
traditional natural gas consumption forecasts enough reserves to last
roughly fifty years.67 Beyond that, however, methane hydrates may be
61. Nicola Jones, The World Eyes Another Unconventional Source of Fossil
Fuels, YALE ENV’T 360 (Aug. 21, 2017), https://e360.yale.edu/features/the-worldeyes-yet-another-unconventional-source-of-fossil-fuels-methane-hydrates
[https://perma.cc/B5UZ-YRF2].
62. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 51.
63. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 19.
64. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 51.
65. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 19.
66. Michon Scott & Rebecca Lindsey, 2017 State of the climate: Global drought,
CLIMATE.GOV (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/featuredimages/2017-state-climate-global-drought [https://perma.cc/S4AH-KA5X].
67. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 20.
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a quasi-green energy source. Scientists familiar with the resource
believe that methane hydrates would produce only one-third of the
carbon amount that traditional fossil fuels produce.68 Comparatively,
a methane hydrate is a “sweet” natural gas that contains relatively few
impurities.69 Methane would not, therefore, produce significant
pollution beyond the possible greenhouse gases, that can be dangerous
to human health like coal.70 In addition, unlike coal, methane does not
produce ash and other carcinogenic materials.71
While significantly reducing the carbon footprint of producing
energy is appetizing, it may not provide the long-term results
necessary to sufficiently reduce carbon emissions. There is, however,
a potential solution to carbon emission present in the extraction of
offshore methane hydrates. The process is known as carbon capture
and sequestration, and, in essence, is a process by which the methane
component of the icy lattice structure is replaced with carbon dioxide,
thereby converting the extraction process into a carbon neutral or
carbon negative activity.72 Other researchers have attempted to
harness the carbon by-product from extraction to attempt to generate
electricity.73
D. Risks Inherent in Offshore Exploration and Extraction of Methane
Hydrates
There are numerous dangers that accompany the process of
exploration and extraction of offshore methane hydrates. For many,
assuming technological innovation allows for methane hydrates to
become a pragmatic alternative energy source, the potential
environmental benefits far outweigh the risks associated with the
exploration and extraction of offshore methane hydrates.74 Others,
however, are more reticent to perform this type of cost-benefit analysis
and believe methane hydrates, even left to their own devices, are
inherently dangerous.75 Methane, as a gas, currently accounts for
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Henriques, supra note 1.
Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE
HYDRATE OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 51.
75. D’Angelo, supra note 9.
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roughly 20% of all human-caused planetary warming.76 Samantha
Joye has referenced methane hydrates as a “ticking time bomb,” and
her fears stem from the notion that rising ocean temperatures will force
methane hydrate structures to destabilize, causing a large release of
methane into the atmosphere.77 Other scientists believe these
apocalyptic notions are a bit jejune in nature; Dr. Carolyn Ruppel has
noted that over 95% of methane hydrates exist more than 1000 meters
below sea level, making a release of methane gas into the atmosphere
very difficult.78 In fact, Dr. Ruppel believes that any methane that
seeped from 1000 meters below sea level would dissolve before it
reached the surface.79
Despite the conflicting understandings of the dangers of
methane hydrates, it is evident that there are risks inherent and unique
to the resource that would be exacerbated upon exploration and
extraction that are not present with the production of other traditional
natural gases.80 Unlike traditional oil and gas, which is found deep
under the secure, rocky seabed, methane hydrates are found on
slopped mud beds that are at risk of slipping.81 Due to the nature of
methane reserves existing on slopped sea beds in the ocean, there are
numerous ways in which the exploration and extraction process could
present environmental hazards.82 The two prevalent risks that stem
from exploration and extraction of offshore methane hydrates are noncataclysmic and cataclysmic events.83
A few prominent, non-cataclysmic hazards that have been
identified are the release of methane into the ocean, impacting
surrounding underwater fauna, and other disturbances on the seabed
that can negatively impact fisheries and other underwater life.84 These
risks, already present from methane seepage, would only be
exacerbated by disturbing the mud bed during the exploration and
extraction process.85 The methane released during the extraction
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS
HYDRATE OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 57.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 66.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 72.
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process could present a problem of toxicity to marine life in
surrounding habitats.86 The release of methane could further present a
problem if conditions were present for the gas to reach the ocean
surface.87 Methane that reaches the surface is called “swamp gas” and
presents visible bubbling and burping at the water’s surface.88 In some
instances, the methane reaching the surface has been so concentrated
that it has killed livestock and humans.89 Furthermore, some scientists
have speculated that a massive disturbance forcing methane to the
water’s surface could disrupt the buoyancy of a boat and force that
boat to sink.90
While non-cataclysmic events pose a constant threat due to the
release or seepage of methane, a cataclysmic event brought on by
extraction of methane hydrates could create large-scale damages to
coastline communities.91 As mentioned above, methane hydrate
reserves located on slopped mud beds allows the reserve to be easily
disturbed.92 The exploration and extraction of methane hydrates could
allow the mud bed structure to lose its integrity, forcing a large-scale
mudslide in the ocean. The impact of a potential mudslide could result
in either a large release of methane gas or an “earthquake-like impact
such as a tsunami.”93 Extraction of this resource presents a problem
because it disassociates the methane hydrate structure in one part of
the deposit, which in turn creates more pressure in other parts of the
deposit.94 This level of instability, if it generates enough energy, can
force large-scale natural disasters.95 It should be noted here that not all
deposits are created equally; methane hydrates found in shallow
waters—depths of 400 meters and below—would generally lack the
conditions to yield a landslide.96 Furthermore, the deeper the mud
layer over the deposit, the safer, as a general matter, the methane
hydrate is from a cataclysmic event.97 Thus, the key to alleviating the
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See id. at 72–73.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id. at 70.
Id.
See generally id. at 76.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 78.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id.
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potential dangers that exist with the extraction of methane hydrates is
to determine the safest deposits available for extraction.98
It is evident, given the risks enumerated above, that the
exploration and extraction of offshore methane hydrates presents
issues that are vastly different than the current risks inherent in
exploration and extraction of traditional oil and gas and the legal and
regulatory frameworks that guide them. In addition, scientists have
stated that a large, contributing factor to the widescale damages caused
by the Deepwater Horizon Spill in 2010 can be attributed to the
“corruption of the containment dome” by methane hydrates.99 While
oil spills can produce damage to individuals and the marine
environment, that damage does not compare to the damages
contemplated by offshore methane hydrate accidents. Thus, it is
imperative to outline the current structure for regulating oil accidents,
focusing particularly on liability and compensation, and determine
whether a new regulatory scheme should be put in place to account for
the large-scale damage that may ensue if an accident were to occur.
III. ASSESSING LIABILITY FOR DRILLING ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES
Typically, liability and risk of offshore exploration and
extraction are discussed in three separate categories.100 The first
category contains the preventative measures that are in place to
attempt to eradicate or alleviate the potential for a spill.101 These
measures typically come in the form of regulatory schemes both
publicly by states, countries, and international bodies as well as those
that are self-imposed by the oil and gas companies.102 From there, the
second category tends to be the reactionary measures in place once a
spill occurs. In essence, the question here is whether a government or
private company has plans in place to effectively clean up a spill once

98. Id. at 87.
99. Zack Colman, Should the World Tap Undersea Methane Hydrates for
Energy?, SCI. AM. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/shoul
d-the-world-tap-undersea-methane-hydrates-for-energy/ [https://perma.cc/8SP6EWMU].
100. See generally MANAGING THE RISK OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ACCIDENTS
(Günther Handl & Kristoffer Svendsen eds., 2019).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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it occurs.103 Finally, the third category discusses how victims affected
by the spill will impose liability.104 The last category focuses mostly
on assessing damages and ensuring the culpable parties adequately
compensate the victims.105
While this Comment focuses primarily on the liability aspect
of managing the risks of offshore methane hydrates, it is imperative to
note that all three categories are necessary for effective regulation of
methane hydrates. While a prevention strategy governing methane
hydrates is important and necessary for the efficient, safe extraction of
the resource, a strong liability regime is more favorable based on the
inherent nature of methane hydrates. Often, accidents occurring are
not a matter of if, but when. Despite the regulatory body’s best
attempts to allay destruction, an accident may be inevitable. For this
reason, there should be more of an impetus on a liability regime, which
is the focus of this Comment. The Author notes, however, that the best
approach is ultimately for both categories to be present. Furthermore,
robust activity in all three categories, or rather a “belt and suspenders”
approach, can provide a complimentary regime that could both enable
private companies to explore and extract methane hydrates, thus
providing a global benefit by making this resource available, and
ensure that anyone affected from a potential spill will be sufficiently
compensated for any loss or damage that occurs.106
In the United States, there are two distinct avenues to pursue a
claim due to an oil spill or other offshore drilling accident. The first
avenue is through tort liability, and the second is through the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990.107 Tort law in this area is a well settled principle
pursuant to the precedent established in the early 20th century, which
has since been affirmed by courts in the wake of the Deepwater
Horizon disaster.108

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE
OPERATIONS, Supra note 13, at 141.
107. Mark Latham, Victor E. Schwartz, & Christopher E. Appel, The Intersection
of Tort and Environmental Law: Where the Twains Should Meet and Depart, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 737, 757 (2011).
108. Id. at 749.
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A. Robins Dry Dock and its Heirs
The seminal case in determining liability in maritime
negligence claims is Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint.109 The
case was a libel action filed by time charters of a steamship against the
dry dock to recover for the use of the steamer due to the defendant’s
negligence in injuring the steamships propeller.110 In a contract
between the two parties, the steamship would be docked every six
months, at which point the defendant negligently injured the propeller,
resulting in the need for a replacement.111 The court ultimately
determined the damage came from the delay caused by having to make
repairs on the propeller, and that would be “a wrong to no one except
for the [defendant’s] contract with the vessel owners.”112 The court
continued to say that, as a general rule, “a tort to the person or property
of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely
because the injured person was under a contract with that other
unknown to the doer of wrong.”113 The court also stated that justice
does not permit the defendant to be charged with the loss unless there
is someone who has a claim in either contract or tort.”114 “Most courts
have concluded Robins Dry Dock has become the pillar for
establishing a bright-line rule for damages recoverable under the
general maritime law for unintentional maritime torts.”115 In essence,
most courts have come to believe that Robins Dry Dock stands for the
proposition that parties are barred from recovering any economic loss
without an accompanying property loss.116
A prime example of this bright-line rule can be seen in In Re
Deepwater Horizon, a case occurring in the wake of the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill.117 In a parenthetical, the Fifth Circuit noted, “This
circuit and others have interpreted Robins Dry Dock to mean that there
can be no recovery for economic losses caused by an unintentional
maritime tort absent physical damage to property in which the victim
109. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
110. Sye J. Broussard, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: An Oil Slick Over Robins
Dry Dock, 8 LOY. L.J. 153, 155 (2010).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. In re Deepwater Horizon, 784 F.3d 1019 (5th Cir. 2015).
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has a proprietary interest.”118 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s holding that the three Mexican States who filed complaints
alleging damages as a result of the oil spill did not hold a sufficient
proprietary interest in the allegedly damaged property, and therefore
were barred from recovery.119 This holding presents multiple issues:
the first being that foreign countries may be barred from recovery
based on a lack of uniformity in the laws. The second, and perhaps
more problematic, is that at one point after the Macondo Well incident,
over 99% of claims filed with the Trust Administrator in the BP spill
were for lost earnings, whereas only 1% related to property damages
caused by the spill.120 In the realm of torts, it appears that these
claimants would be without any judicial reprieve. Enter the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990.
B. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (the “Act”) was a direct response
to the Exxon-Valdez Spill that occurred in 1989.121 The Act was
intended to provide quick cleanup of spills and allow compensation of
victims of such spills.122 In addition, the Act clarified which damages
were compensable and softened the causation standard.123 Perhaps the
main departure from the traditional tort method of recovering losses
in this arena was that the Act allowed victims who experienced pure
economic loss due to an oil spill to bring a cause of action regardless
of proprietary ownership.124 Furthermore, the Act imposes strict
liability on parties responsible for the discharge of oil on navigable
waters.125 The imposition of strict liability implies a duty is inherent
to the nature of the work.126 Now, plaintiffs will not need to prove that
an activity occurred negligently, rather they will merely need to prove

118. Id. at 1024.
119. Id. at 1030.
120. MANAGING THE RISK OF OFFSHORE OIL
100, at 288–89.
121. Id.
122. Broussard, supra note 110, at 155.
123. MANAGING THE RISK OF OFFSHORE OIL
100, at 288–89.
124. Id.
125. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2018).
126. MANAGING THE RISK OF OFFSHORE OIL
100, at 289.
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the activity occurred.127 While the Act facially appears to provide an
avenue for more victims to bring suit for any perceived tortfeasors, it
is unclear whether victims have in fact filed more claims because of
the Act.128 The Act appeared to relax the causation standard. However,
by using the phrase “due to” and omitting any language requiring a
proximate cause, the Act creates uncertainty regarding its ultimate
intent.129
First, it can be demonstrated that factual causation is required
to bring a claim under the statute.130 “In other words, it must be proved
that the claimant sustained pure economic loss, such as lost profits,
and/or impairment from earning capacity ‘due to’ natural resource
damage, which ‘resulted from’ an oil spill in navigable waters.”131 The
seemingly simple standard may in fact be difficult to prove and costly
to litigants; to establish a factual connection, one may need a forensic
accounting of events as well as “in-depth[,] local[,] economic
knowledge before and after the spill.”132 The issue of proximate cause,
however, is less certain. The statute providing the liability standard
does not explicitly determine the causation standard, and no court has
specifically determined the intent of the statute on this matter.133 One
judge opined that the causation standard “may lie somewhere between
traditional ‘proximate cause’ and simple ‘but for’ causation.”134 Other
authors have argued that the statute only articulates a “but for” test of
causation, but this test is further limited by both the scope and purpose
of the statute and the explicit monetary limit on damages imposed by
Congress.135 The scope and purpose argument diminishes the question
of proximate cause and eliminates the need for a foreseeability
inquiry, which would prevent further ambiguity in the statute.136
Further, the absence of a proximate cause standard within the statute,
when the standard is present in other federal statutes imposing
liability, is also telling.137 The proximate cause language appears one
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 288–289.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 291.
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Id. at 294.
Id. at 288–289.
Id. at 299–300.
Id. at 300.
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time in an exception provision dealing with the removal of the liability
cap.138 The lack of explicit proximate cause language demonstrates
Congress’s intent to leave that standard out of the analysis for liability
under the Act.139
Second, and perhaps more important, Congress provided an
explicit limit on cause-in-fact liability by instituting monetary caps on
recovery.140 The monetary cap ensures that recoveries do not exceed
the explicit dollar limit.141 In particular, the cap is based on different
categories that each tanker or drilling rig would fall into.142 For
instance, an oil tanker that is 100,000 tons would be liable for up to
$120 million.143 The monetary caps represent two policies that are
inextricably and inherently at odds with one another.144 On one hand,
a monetary cap allows different companies to enter the market with
the knowledge and certitude of their putative liability from a spill. On
the other hand, the monetary cap would effectively reduce the
recovery amount awarded to a class of plaintiffs affected by the
spill.145
In these instances, where civil liability rules appear to be shortsided, the presence of regulatory rules is imperative to ensure that
drilling companies are compliant with safety and environmental
standards.146 An effective regulatory scheme helps to alleviate the
tension caused by the issues implicit in the monetary cap regime of the
Act.147 The liability structure in the United States appears to work in
most cases, except with regard to victims who suffer a pure economic
loss. The ultimate issue is that any accident stemming from the
extraction of methane hydrates could potentially wreak havoc to the
extent that the monetary cap would prevent numerous victims from
being compensated for their loss. Clearly, a monetary cap on liability
would not be the best regime for the extraction of offshore methane
Moratorium Damages, 28 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 31, 43–44 (2017).
138. HANDL & SVENDSEN, supra note 100, at 300–01.
139. Id. at 301.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 301. n. 67.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 301.
145. Id.
146. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 133–34.
147. Id. at 134.
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hydrates as it would leave many victims without a forum for their
cause of action.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAWS GOVERNING DRILLING ACCIDENTS
Given the complexity and uncertainty around liability in the
United States for offshore oil spills, one must consider whether there
are any international conventions or treaties that provide and enforce
liability to offshore accidents. Many oil spills, by their ability to reach
waters beyond specific territorial boundaries, “become international
events.”148 A robust and unified international scheme could provide
and enforce liability to offshore accidents in ways that individual
country regimes could not. A review of the current international laws
will further demonstrate that a stronger international convention is
needed, especially in dealing with offshore methane hydrates. Experts
have articulated that there are currently “large gaps in what the
international agreements cover.”149 In the wake of the BP spill, many
have reflected that a spill infiltrating international waters would
further reveal the large holes in the international regulations.150 Due to
the erratic and perhaps dangerous nature of methane hydrates, it is
imperative to have a cogent and unified regulatory system in place to
ensure recompense for any issues that may arise.
A. United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea
The most prominent reform in property rights over
international waters came from the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea in 1982, which created the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).151 UNCLOS divided
the sea into distinct territorial zones, each subject to different legal
status.152 Most importantly for the extraction of methane hydrates,
148. Katie Galbraith, Gap Rules on Oil Spills from Wells, N.Y. TIMES (May 16,
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/business/energy-environment/17gree
n.html [https://perma.cc/26FN-VY9P].
149. Id.
150. Yee Huang, International Law Implications of the BP Oil Spill, CENTER FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM (June 8, 2010), http://progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?i
dBlog=FBF393AA-EE0A-FF0C-695B9BA163B50BDB [https://perma.cc/D4WUDSF7].
151. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
152. Id.
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UNCLOS established that the first 200 nautical miles off the coast
would be the Exclusive Economic Zone of each state, unless other
states’ boundaries conflict with that measurement. For purposes of
determining liability for offshore methane hydrate accidents,
UNCLOS’s important effect relates to the duties and standards to
protect the marine environment set forth by the international
agreement.153 Currently, over 168 nations have ratified the treaty;
however, the United States is not one of them.154 The United States,
despite not ratifying the treaty, has signed the document and has
agreed to follow the principles of UNCLOS because they crystalize
customary international law.155 When proposing the convention to the
different nation states, Ronald Reagan announced that the United
States will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their
coasts pursuant to both the convention and customary maritime law.156
Customary international law is widely recognized as a binding source
of international law, when two elements are met.157 The first element
is state practice, which can be defined as any act or statement by a
state.158 The second element, Opinio Juris, requires a belief that the
act is legally necessary or that the nation conducts themselves out of a
sense of legal obligation.159 In essence, the United States is bound by
customary international law principles codified in UNCLOS;
therefore, the international convention has bearing on a conversation
regarding offshore resources in transboundary areas.
Part XII of UNCLOS and, more specifically, Article 192
provide an obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment.160 Furthermore, countries that are a part of UNCLOS are
required to “ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are
conducted so as not to cause damage by pollution to other [countries]
and their environment.”161 UNCLOS requires the development of
regulatory systems prior to the commercial development of methane
153. Grant Wilson, Deepwater Horizon and the Law of the Sea: Was the Cure
Worse than the Disease?, 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 63, 84-85 (2014).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. LORI F. DAMROSCH, LOUIS HENKIN, SEAN D. MURPHY & HANS SUIT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1374 (5th ed. 2009).
157. Wilson, supra note 153, at 85.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 87.
160. Id. at 84.
161. Huang, supra note 150.
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hydrates.162 “Rules, regulations[,] and procedures shall be drawn up in
order to secure effective protection of the marine environment from
harmful effects directly resulting from activities in the ‘Area’ if
undertaken with regards to the exploitation of minerals, such as
methane hydrates.”163 The “Area” is a reference to the area outside of
the exclusive, economic zone that belongs to everyone and should be
mined for the benefit of mankind.164 Finally, if an operator causes
harm because of an offshore accident, they will be liable for the actual
amount of damage.165 According to Professor Roy Partain, “UNCLOS
has sufficient ambit to regulate the development of the methane
hydrates. [T]here would need to be a new set of regulations and rules
to establish proper safety practices and methods of handling
environmental damages. Such rules and regulations currently do not
exist.”166
B. The International Seabed Authority
The International Seabed Authority (“ISA”) is an authority
established by UNCLOS to regulate mineral extraction from
international waters.167 In particular, the ISA is in the process of
promulgating the Mining Code, which is intended to cover all
environmental, financial, reporting, and regulatory obligations
incurred by “seabed mining operations.”168 The ISA originally
anticipated that the Mining Code would be published in 2020;
however, the timetable has been pushed back as it has taken more time
to develop exploitation regulations.169 Currently, the ISA is inviting
delegates to send written comments on draft exploitation regulations
162. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 194.
163. Id.
164. A
Glance
at
the
Mining
Code,
DSM
OBSERVER,
https://dsmobserver.com/2017/07/glance-mining-code/
[https://perma.cc/ZX7QNW2H].
165. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 194.
166. Id.
167. A Glance at the Mining Code, supra note 164.
168. Id.
169. International Seabed Authority Under Pressure Over Deep-sea Mining
Impacts,
WORLD
OCEAN
INITIATIVE
(Aug.
16,
2019),
https://www.woi.economist.com/international-seabed-authority-under-pressureover-deep-sea-mining-impacts/ [https://perma.cc/389S-3CJW].
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for their meeting in February of 2020.170 In that same invitation, the
ISA called for proposals to study an environmental compensation fund
in the context of minerals in the “Area.”171 The proposal recognizes
that in the current system, a company or operator will only be liable to
the extent that the damage occurring arises out of a wrongful act.172
The proposal is an attempt to establish a trust fund that would
compensate victims when a state is not considered liable.173 It is also
clear that the ISA is aware and has contemplated the extraction of
offshore methane hydrates; in assembly notes from 2008, the ISA
mentioned the innovations put forth by Japan in experimenting with
the resource.174 The question then is whether a compensation fund will
be able to compensate victims from offshore methane hydrate
exploitation accidents. Given the amount of damage that is possible, it
is unclear whether a compensation fund could cover the extensive
claims brought by the innumerable putative victims, especially when
a state actor is not liable.
C. International Maritime Organization and the Civil Liability
Convention
Adopted in 1948 at an international conference in Geneva,
Switzerland, the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) was
formally established to improve the safety of the sea by developing
international regulations.175 The IMO has produced many conventions
regarding the safety of the sea; however, one main convention
promulgated by the IMO, the Civil Liability Convention (“CLC”),
may provide some insight into the international regulation of offshore
170. Id.
171. Int’l Seabed Auth. [ISA], Call for Proposals for a Study on an
Environmental Compensation Fund in the Context of Exploitation of Minerals in the
Area, ¶ 4, at 1 (Feb. 5, 2020), https://ran-s3.s3.amazonaws.com/isa.org.jm/s3fspublic/files/documents/ecf.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KDJ-QU5J].
172. Id. ¶ 3, at 2.
173. Id.
174. Int’l Seabed Auth. [ISA], Report of the Secretary-General of the
International Seabed Authority Under Article 166, Paragraph 4, of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. ¶ 101, (June 6, 2008), https://rans3.s3.amazonaws.com/isa.org.jm/s3fs-public/documents/EN/14Sess/Ass/ISBA14A-2.pdf [ https://perma.cc/CW8A-CRWR].
175. Brief History of IMO, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (Aug. 28,
2020),
http://www.imo.org/en/About/HistoryOfIMO/Pages/Default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/5PM8-SWDK].
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methane hydrates. It should be noted that, currently, the CLC would
not apply to offshore methane hydrates;176 however, the convention
may provide an understanding to how regulations for offshore
methane hydrates may be successful. Notably, the CLC provides strict
liability in the sense that reasonable care cannot shield the owner from
liability and eventual repayment of damages.177 Furthermore, the CLC
typically puts liability squarely on the owner, with some exceptions.178
Facially, the CLC allows for pure economic loss; however, it is often
curtailed by a “scope and purpose” inquiry that inhibits full recovery
from loss.179 Under the CLC, salmon farmers, fishers, divers
maintaining salmon cages, ice producers supplying salmon farmers,
and box manufacturers have been able to bring claims against oil and
gas companies.180 Ironically enough, employees at fishing plants were
unable to bring claims of lost wages because their hours were reduced
due to accidents that damaged the fish market.181 This contradiction
demonstrates that some pure economic loss claims are honored,
whereas others are deemed too attenuated to receive compensation. In
this regard, it appears that the CLC is narrower than the OPA in the
sense that it does not allow secondary or relational claims to be
brought.182
With relative uncertainty with the CLC and a lack of a
substantive framework within UNCLOS regarding liability of
offshore accidents, it is no wonder that many have advocated for a
uniform, international regime instituting liability for offshore
accidents.183 Though many private companies do their best to create
their own regulatory policies, an international, public, regulatory
scheme “will become necessary in the future.”184 In addition,
unilateral regimes like the one in the United States may not provide
176. See generally PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE
METHANE HYDRATE OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 219.
177. Id. at 220.
178. Id.
179. MANAGING THE RISK OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ACCIDENTS, supra note
100, at 303.
180. Id. (See note 74 where the Author discusses the secondary economic claims
that have been barred by varying courts).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Ekaterina Anyanova, Oil Pollution and International Marine Environmental
Law, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: AUTHORITATIVE AND LEADING EDGE
CONTENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (Sime Curkovic ed., 2011) (ebook).
184. Id.
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the most efficient means of enforcing liability and may even be
“damaging to the international economy.”185 In the very least, it is
profoundly evident that a uniform, international scheme is necessary
when methane hydrate exploration and extraction becomes
commercially viable.
V. PROPOSED REGULATORY ENACTMENTS
It is evident that the novel nature of offshore methane hydrates
presents risks that are not currently contemplated by the regimes in
place regulating offshore oil and gas exploration and extraction. “The
risks of cataclysmic accidents are unique to the specific operations of
offshore methane hydrate fields…”186 It is therefore imperative to
implement a uniform scheme that can handle the risks inherent in
offshore methane hydrates.
First, the principles of strict liability should govern the
regulatory scheme, rather than the principles of negligence or the
modified strict liability seen in the United States. There are dueling
policies when discussing the two different regimes. First, a negligence
standard provides a safe harbor for energy players who are
determining the risks before entering the market. Given the dangerous
nature of offshore methane hydrates, different companies may be
reluctant to waste money researching a way to commercially develop
the resource that provides too much liability to the activity. Given the
unique potential for danger, a negligence standard would prevent
victims from having a forum as long as the energy actors are acting
reasonably during the exploration and extraction. Ultimately, given
the dangers associated with offshore methane hydrate exploration and
extraction and the potential for unfathomable damage stemming from
putative accidents, a strict liability standard without monetary caps or
other causation standards is preferable because it ensures that victims
will be able to secure judgments for damages that occur.
Second, given the ubiquitous nature of the offshore methane
hydrates across the globe, the ideal solution is to implement the strict
liability standard through an international convention. The difficulty
in countries unilaterally determining laws is that the accidents caused
185. Id.
186. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 156.
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by offshore methane hydrates have the capability of moving beyond
territorial waters, thus becoming an international issue. Implementing
a strict liability standard to govern offshore methane hydrates provides
uniformity and reliability in the sense that other nation states will not
be without a forum if an international accident does occur.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has been the earnest attempt of the Author to apprise the
reader of the energy resource known as methane hydrates and their
global abundance. In addition, their chemical composition presents an
opportunity to the global energy market that could theoretically
replace other types of oil and gas as the march for renewable energy
presses onward. With these exciting opportunities, however, there are
real and present dangers that are inexorably intertwined with the
commercial development of offshore methane hydrates. These
complex hazards, in conjunction with the lack of certitude regarding
how liability will be assessed when an accident occurs, have been a
major barrier to energy in the offshore methane hydrate market. This
Comment presented regulatory and liability rules governing offshore
oil and gas accidents in the United States and how liability is assessed
in international regimes in hopes of determining whether major
changes are necessary to incorporate methane hydrates. Currently, the
hybrid form of strict liability in the United States does not allot for
pure economic loss and is limited by monetary caps and causation
standards. Furthermore, while UNCLOS may have the teeth to enforce
international liability, there are no specific regulations that allow it to
do so, and the Mining Code promulgated by the ISA is not currently
in force and may not encompass the issues presented by offshore
methane hydrates. It is evident that, given the dangerous nature of
offshore methane hydrate exploration and extraction, a strict liability
standard should be adopted internationally and enforced through
UNCLOS and the ISA to ensure uniformity of the rules and provide
an avenue for victims to bring claims against the private companies.

